The jihad
December 1754 was Sheik Uthman dan Fodio’s birth month. At age twenty, he began preaching. After traveling over Hausaland preaching, he eventually built his home in Degel. He drew academics and students here. A Muslim community that was independent and disapproving of the Gobir regime developed gradually. There were indications of tension in Dan Fodio’s relationship with the Gobir kings by the late 1770s. When Bawa, the sheikh, and the monarch of Gobir met in 1789 or thereabouts, Dan Fodio took use of the occasion to get five concessions from Bawa. The modifications included:
- 1. To let Uthman dan Fodio openly preach Islam;
- 2. To not forbid anyone from approaching him
- 3. That turban wearers ought to be treated with respect
- 4. That repressive tax shouldn’t be imposed on people
- 5. That inmates ought to be freed
The fact that Bawa made these concessions indicates that Uthman dan Fodio had gained clout by that point. The concession demonstrated that there was something in Gobir for Hausa and Fulani, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. And there’s no denying that Dan Fodio’s status increased as a result of these concessions being granted. Bawa’s motion, though, was unable to stop the action. For example, in the years 1794–1795, the sheikh not only declared that he had seen a vision indicating a Jihad, but he also gave his followers permission to equip themselves.
The nafata, the Gobir monarch who had succeeded Bawa, correctly perceived their conduct in gathering weapons as a threat. Nafata consequently declared that women could not wear veils and that males should not wear turbans, and that only Dan Fodio should be permitted to preach. He also called for an increase in the number of Muslims who converted to Islam. Yunfa took Nafata’s place in 1802. He proved to be more severe than Fodio.
The final straw that ignited the fight was the Abd-al-Salam incident. Yunfa’s forces launched an assault on Gimbana, the town of Abd-al-Salam, who was Uthman dan Fodio’s disciple. When the soldiers were leaving and returning from the expedition, Abd-al-Salam declined to pray and bless them. Even worse, Uthman dan Fodio ordered the release of the Muslim detainees that Yunfa’s troops had been holding. This was a direct challenge to Yunfa’s authority.
On February 23, 1804, Uthman dan Fodio and his community relocated from Degel to Gudu out of fear of attack. In keeping with the Prophet Mohammed’s departure from Mecca to Medina in September of 622, this movement is called the hijra. This movement drew lines of tension between Uthman dan Fodio and his community on the one hand, and Yunfa and his subject, who were now considered unbelievers, on the other. Shortly after, Uthman Dan Fodio was recognized by the Muslim community as Amir-al-Mu’minin, or the commander of the faithful. There were two important aspects to this evolution.
The Muslims’ abandonment of the Gobir ruler signaled the end of their relationship with that country. It also marked the start of the Sokoto Caliphate.
The war.
At Tabkin Kwotto in April 1804, the Gobir troops and Uthman and Fodio warriors engaged in combat for the first time. With a hundred heavily armed cavalry, the Gobir army was numerically superior, but Yunfa’s men were routed due to the sheikh’s forces’ greater morale and resolve. The other early conflicts, which took place at Makankari and Konni between April and June 1804, were likewise won by the jihadists. The fighting extended from Gobir to neighboring Hausa states. After Kebbi, the capital of Birnin Kebbi, fell in April 1805, Uthman and Fodio armies took control of Zamfara and other regions of the State. They had taken control of Katsina, Daura, Kano, and Zaria between 1805 and 1807. Kotongora, Gombe, Bauch Adamawa, and Illorin Nupe fell later.
Why the Jihad was successful.
Early consecutive wins were one important component that made the Jihad successful. In every battle, the jihadists prevailed despite their diminished numbers and subpar weapons. The Muslims’ strong morale made up for their lack of resources and force. Their faith gave them a tremendous boost in spirit. They think that by taking part in the “holy war,” they would benefit and would continue to profit regardless of what happened to them. Paradise was a certain prize if they perished. Should they make it through the fight, they would be granted a portion of the spoils and later bliss in paradise. Early successes, like the one at the fight of Tabkin Kwotto, galvanized more support since many previously neutral people began to believe that Allah was endorsing the jihadist cause. The commanders of the jihad used these successes to boost morale and use them as massive propaganda tools.
He formed contact during Uthman Dan-Fodio’s preaching tour, which subsequently turned out to be very helpful when the real combat started. While on a preaching journey in Kebbi, he met Uthman Massa, a prince of Kebbi. Later, during the years of the Jihad, Massa was useful in the invasion of Kebbi. Former students who returned to their home states rose to prominence as Uthman dan- Fodio jihad flag bearers. Yaqub of Bauchi and Modibo Adamu of Adamawa were two examples. Thus, the establishment of a local group in Hausaland and elsewhere helps Jihad spread quickly.
Uthman Dan-Fodio was a learned scholar and a devout, charismatic Muslim. He printed pamphlets in Arabic and preached in Hausa. Many people were drawn to him, both Muslims and non-Muslims, by this quality and his appealing personality. When conflict finally broke out, the Hausa peasantry as well as the Fulani and Tuareg nomads who intended to gain from the changes proposed by Uthman Dan-Fodio were either eager to help him or, at the very least, move.
In addition, after the Degel community was founded, it developed into a haven. One example is the escape of slaves from their master to become Muslim free agents.
Additionally, there was the caliber of the leadership demonstrated by dan-Fodio and those who followed him, particularly Muhammad Bello and his brother Abdullahi. Their followers were impressed by their knowledge, religiosity, and commitment to duty.
But in addition to the intellectual group’s leadership of the jihad, the Fulani group’s resolute support of the campaign was vital. The ethnic stock of Fulani people was highly coherent. They were unwilling to entrust their daughters to people from different ethnic groups, despite the fact that they may marry outside of their community. Furthermore, there existed intimate communication between the Fulani town and the Fulani cattle. Large herds were frequently owned by the major town Fulani, which gave it indirect authority over a sizable portion of its nomadic brethren.
Uthman dan- Fodio and other Fulani scholars were close to their family members. Their social solidarity was reinforced by this circumstance, which helps to explain why they readily identified as jihadists.
The Fulani were frequently attacked by the Bambara and Tuaregs during their journey from the Hausaland region of Senegal. The Fulani were nomadic people that roamed over Hausaland in quest of good pasture. They settled in semi-permanent settlements and adapted to hard living conditions. They were often raided by the hausa in search of cattle. As a result, Fulani communities were set up defensively, with a militia belonging to each group to protect them from attacks. Therefore, the Fulani had some experience defending themselves before the Jihad.
Because of their weakness and division, the Hausa were unable to repel the jihadists. Since they perceived Dan Fodio’s movement as a strong alternative to their kings’ repressive authority and high taxes, a large number of Hausa peasants joined him. Although the Fulani collaborated and supported one another, Yunfa’s plea for assistance was ignored by the Hausa Kings. The Hausa states were unable to unite against a common enemy due to their longstanding culture of endemic animosity. Because of its animosity with Gobir, Zamfara initially backed the jihadists against the latter. Political unrest-related division also made several of the states weaker. For example, in Nupe and Ilorin, the jihadists were able to take advantage of the differences between the local ruling group.
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